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Arché Research Centre, University of St. Andrews
What is it to explain away an intuition? Philosophers regularly attempt to explain
intuitions away, but it is oen unclear what the success conditions for their project
consist in. I attempt to articulate some of these conditions, taking philosophical
case studies as guides, and arguing that many attempts to explain away intuitions
underestimate the challenge the project of explaining away involves. I will conclude,
therefore, that explaining away intuitions is amore dicult task than has sometimes
been appreciated; I also suggest, however, that the importance of explaining away
intuitions has oen been exaggerated.
Keywords: intuitions
When a philosopher’s theory has counterintuitive consequences, she of-
ten feels pressure to explain away the oending intuition. What is it to ex-
plain away an intuition? How canwe tell whether an attempt to explain away
an intuition has been successful? I’ll start with some case studies, present-
ing and evaluating philosophers’ attempts to explain away intuitions; this
should help us to identify the central features of successful and unsuccess-
ful attempts. en I’ll turn to the question, under what circumstances is a
philosopher obliged to explain intuitions away? My answer is: fewer than
is sometimes supposed. I’ll conclude with some remarks about the value of
explaining away intuitions.
1. ree Elements to Explaining Away
In his “How to defeat opposition toMoore”, Ernest Sosa (1999) suggests that
safety is a necessary condition for knowledge.1
Safety S knows that p only if, S would believe that p only if p were the
case
Corresponding author’s address: Jonathan Ichikawa, Arché Philosophical Research Centre,
eUniversity of St Andrews, 17-19 College Street, St Andrews, Fife, KY16 9AL,UnitedKing-
dom. Email: ichikawa@gmail.com.
1 In his more recent work, Sosa demures from Safety. See, e.g., (Sosa 2007a, 26).
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And he argues that, the “undeniable intuitive attractiveness” (Sosa 1999,
141) of such a necessary condition notwithstanding, sensitivity is not neces-
sary for knowledge:
Sensitivity S knows that p only if, were p not the case, S would not be-
lieve that p.
Sosa apparently feels some pressure towards explaining away the intu-
itive appeal of Sensitivity; he attempts to do so by suggesting that safety
and sensitivity, being counterfactual contrapositives of one another, are not
equivalent, but might easily be thought to be. When one embraces Sensitiv-
ity, one is reacting to the truth of Safety, and, confusing the one for the other,
one announces that Sensitivity is true.2
e pattern Sosa suggests is structurally like that of someone who thinks
that Sonic collected gold coins, because hermemory of 1990-era video games
is hazy, and she is confusing Sonic (who collected gold rings) with Mario,
who did collect gold coins. Gold coins are not the same as gold rings, but it
is easy to confuse one for the other. She is reacting to an implicitly-known
truth, but that truth becomes somewhat garbled, and issues into a mistaken
intuition. is is, of course, a perfectly respectable form of an explaining-
away. Plausibly, this story is a correct explaining-away, for some people, of
the judgment that Sonic collected gold coins.
e Sonic andMario case includes, as a central element, a psychological
claim about the etiology of a certain belief: the explaining-away relies essen-
tially on the claim the judgment that Sonic collected gold coins derives in
part from a conation between gold coins and gold rings (or between Sonic
and Mario)—the explaining-away predicts that the individual who makes
themistaken judgment ismaking it for this particular reason. If this psycho-
logical claim is false, then the explaining-away fails. As I suggested above, I
expect that this explaining-away is likely to succeed, for at least some indi-
viduals. Some people do have Sonic andMario muddled in their memories.
(Most of those people spent less time playing video games in the early 1990s
than did the present author.)
Sosa’s own attempt relies on a similar empirical psychological claim,
namely that those who accept sensitivity as a necessary condition on knowl-
edge (or perhaps: some signicant class of thosewho accept it) do so because
they are confusing sensitivity with its contrapositive, safety.
is psychological claim by itself, of course, does not establish that safety
is a necessary condition on knowledge, or that sensitivity is not. Sosa’s argu-
2 I am using the capitalized ‘Safety’ and ‘Sensitivity’ to refer to the principles stated above;
‘safety’ and ‘sensitivity’ refer to the counterfactual properties that, according to Safety and
Sensitivity, are required for knowledge.
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ment for these conclusions is independent of the psychological explaining-
away. (e argument, broadly speaking, is that Sensitivity is subject to coun-
terexample, and that Safety best explains various cases.) Sosa motivates and
defends a particular theory—Safety is true, but Sensitivity is not—then rec-
ognizes that it faces certain counterintuitive consequences; he is therefore at
this stage committed to the claim that some of our intuitions are incorrect.
He gilds this pill with an attempt to explain those intuitions away. is ex-
planation, like all explainings-away, relies centrally on a psychological claim:
that safety and sensitivity, being contrapositives, are easily confused. For the
attempt to be successful, at least these two conditions must be met: the psy-
chological claims towhich the explaining-away appealsmust (a) be true, and
(b) predict the oending intuition.
How does Sosa’s explaining-away here fare? His psychological claim is
something like this:
Confusion We’re inclined, whenwe recognize that some counterfactual
is necessary for some condition, to intuit also that the con-
trapositive of that counterfactual is necessary for that con-
dition, even when it is not.
Sosa says little in particular defense of Confusion; a few examples of sim-
ilar patterns of error would be helpful. Someone more ambitious might cite
more explicit psychological data that directly established such patterns. But
I am inclined to think that Sosa is on rm ground in suggesting that many
people do not ordinarily distinguish counterfactual conditionals from their
contrapositives. Indeed, many people might, aer brief reection, endorse
the equivalence of contrapositive counterfactuals. It takes a bit of clever-
ness to come up with a counterexample to the equivalence: (AC) ≡ (∼
C∼A).
(Sosa’s own counterexample is: if this faucet were to leak, it would not
both leak and be tightly closed; but if it were to both leak and be tightly
closed, it would leak (Sosa 1999, 150).)
So Sosa seems to be on reasonably rm ground in establishing (a), the
truth of Confusion. And (b) is, in this case, straightforward; it is obvious
that safety and sensitivity are contrapositives, so it is clear that Confusion
predicts the oending intuition.
ese are necessary conditions for explaining away, but they’re not suf-
cient. For it is consistent with (a) and (b), for instance, that one “explain
away” the intuition that p with the psychological claim that one’s intuitions
are sensitive to the truth, along with the philosophical claim that p is true.
is, of course, is no explaining away.ere is something to explaining away
over and above mere explaining. A third condition, therefore, is necessary:
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(c) the explanation must not rely on the truth of the target intuition.3
Stronger and weaker readings of this condition are available. At least,
the explanation must not entail the truth of the target intuition. But can-
didate explainings-away could fail to be suciently independent from the
truth of the target intuitions without entailing them; for instance, an alleged
explaining-away that dramatically probabilied the target intuition would,
for that reason, fail.
A closer attempt to characterizewhat is demanded by the third condition
is this: the explaining-away must have it that the target intuition be insensi-
tive to its truth, in that, were its content not true, the subject would have the
intuition anyway. For example, if the reason you think that Sonic collected
gold coins is that you’re failing to distinguish, in memory, gold coins from
gold rings, then your belief is not sensitive to whether he did in fact collect
gold coins; you would think he did, even if he did not—even if he collected
gold rings instead.4
To challenge Sosa’s explaining-away with respect to meeting this condi-
tion (c) would be to admit that counterfactuals and their contrapositives are
not oen distinguished in unreective judgments, but to argue that this is as
it should be, because, apparent counterexamples notwithstanding, counter-
factuals do contrapose. We’ve been given an explanation of the intuition, but
one on which it is veridical. Someone taking this line ought to have some-
thing to say about the apparent counterexamples, like the faucet-leak case
above; a counter-explaining-away would probably be in order.5 My present
project is not denitively to judge Sosa’s explaining away in one direction or
the other; it is to use the case study in order to help articulate the rules of
the game. What is necessary for a good explaining away, and how does one
evaluate an attempt to explain away?
Plausibly, (c) will not quite result, in conjunction with (a) and (b), in a
sucient condition for explaining away. It may be, for instance, that all three
conditions will be met in an appropriate case of abductive reasoning. For
3 Such phrases as “the truth of the intuition” refer to the truth of the content of an intuition;
as I use the term, an intuition is true just in case it has a true content. (Similarly, a belief
is true just in case its content is true.) anks to an anonymous referee for pressing this
clarication.
4 Applying the rule to the philosophical example at hand is somewhat trickier. Whether
sensitivity is necessary for knowledge is, plausibly, a necessary fact, and it is not clear how
it is to be evaluated when negated in the antecedent of a counterfactual. “You think that
sensitivity is necessary for knowledge because you’re confusing sensitivity for safety, which
is inequivalent; so you would think that sensitivity is necessary for knowledge whether or
not it really is.”is diculty is common to knowledge of necessary truths generally.ere
is, I trust, an intuitive sense inwhichwe canmake sense of “counterpossibles” such as these.
See, e.g., (Nolan 1997), (Kment 2006).
5 As, for example, in (Ichikawa forthcoming).
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example, suppose that I observe green emeralds and inductively conclude
that all emeralds are green. Perhaps, on pain of widespread skepticism, we
should not be willing to conclude that we can explain away my conclusion
by pointing out that I formed my belief inductively, and that I would think
that all emeralds were green, even if some unobserved ones were not.6
Even if (a)–(c) do not comprise sucient conditions for explaining away,
I hope that I have established each to be necessary. In §2, I’ll apply these
conditions to three further case studies.
2. Case Studies
Consideration of some particular attempts to explain away intuitions will, I
hope, both illustrate the application of the conditions articulated in §1, and
motivate the thought that explaining away intuitions is more dicult than
is oen appreciated; many prominent attempts to explain away intuitions
fail these necessary conditions in relatively obvious ways. Philosophers too
oen underappreciate the diculty of positing psychological theories about
the origins of particular intuitions that meet all three of (a)–(c); to do so,
one must posit a judgment pattern that is specic enough to predict the tar-
get intuitions, but one general enough to be clearly insensitive. Still, it must
be suciently constrained to be plausibly attributed to those with the tar-
get intuitions. ree examples will illustrate the tensions that these criteria
generate.
2.1 Hawthorne
In his book Knowledge and Lotteries, John Hawthorne considers a puzzle
for invariantist approaches to knowledge. e puzzle is this: I read ine
Times that Manchester United won; I truste Times on good grounds; in
fact, it is both generally reliable and correct in this instance. So, on pain
of general skepticism, we should say that I know that w—that Manchester
United won—and also that I know thate Times said that w.
I also know thate Guardian includes results of football games, and,
likee Times, is very reliable about it. (I’m inclined to trust both papers
equally.) I have not reade Guardian today, but I know (perhaps on in-
ductive grounds, perhaps through testimony) that it says something about
yesterday’s Manchester United game.
Since I know thate Times reported thatw, and I know thatw, and that
e Guardian reported one way or the other about w, it might seem that I
should be able knowledgeably to infer from these facts that either bothe
Times ande Guardian reported correctly thatw, or elsee Guardianmis-
6 anks to Cameron Buckner for helpful discussion here.
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takenly reported that∼w. But, intuitively, that disjunction does not comprise
knowledge. Hawthorne’s commitments—including closure, invariantism,
and anti-skepticism—have the implication that in the case given above, I
know the disjunction. But this is counterintuitive. Hawthorne faces this re-
calcitrant intuition:
Ignorance In the case considered, I do not know that either bothe
Times and e Guardian reported correctly that w, or else
e Guardianmistakenly reported that ∼w.
Ignorance is intuitive; it is, perhaps, just the sort of intuition that might
motivate contextualismabout ‘knows’. ButHawthorne, the invariantist, wants
to reject Ignorance, explaining its intuitiveness away. His explanation pro-
ceeds as follows.
Members of a certain class of disjunctions, Hawthorne says, have a prop-
erty that inclines us to intuit that they are unknown, even when they are
known. Hawthorne calls such propositions ‘junk disjunctive knowledge’.
(He attributes the name to Roy Sorensen.) Roughly speaking, a junk knowl-
edge disjunction is a disjunction that is known only by virtue of knowledge
of one of the disjuncts; were you to learn that disjunct to be false, you would
reject the disjunction. is contrasts with the usual case, in which when
you know that A or B, you can infer that B when you acquire evidence that
not-A. Hawthorne emphasizes, reasonably enough, that useful disjunctive
knowledge is not junk:
[W]hen information is usefully encoded by a disjunction, one’s knowl-
edge of that disjunction is not grounded simply in knowledge of one
of the disjuncts. If you tell me that you will go either to Paris or to
Rome this summer,my knowledge of that disjunction is not grounded
inmy knowledge of one or the other of the alternatives. Correlatively,
I am primed to do disjunctive syllogism were I to acquire the belief
that one of the disjuncts is false. So if I later learn that you have de-
cided not to go to Paris, I will conclude that youwill be going to Rome.
(Hawthorne 2004, 71–72)
So the intuition that I do not know the disjunction above is a case where
we have the intuition that, for some piece of junk disjunctive knowledge, I
do not know it.is, Hawthorne suggests, provides the resources to explain
away the oending intuition. What he needs is for skeptical intuitions about
junk disjunctive knowledge to be unreliable. He claims this result in the
suggestion that we intuit junk disjunctive propositions to be unknown, even
when they are in fact known.
When one balks at the idea that I know that either e Times and
e Guardian correctly reported a Manchester United victory or else
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e Guardianmade amistake, one imagines that I am so situated that,
were I to reade Guardian and notice it said thatManchester United
had lost (or drawn), I would be able to use my disjunctive knowledge
to infer that it wase Guardian that had made a mistake. It would
indeed be absurd to suppose that I am so situated, but it does not
follow that I do not know the disjunction. We are apt to confuse use-
ful disjunctive knowledge with junk disjunctive knowledge. Having
recognized that disjunctive knowledge is not useful, we are prone to
think that it is not knowledge at all. (Hawthorne 2004, 72–73)
e claim appears to be that generally, when we encounter disjunctions
that are not, in the relevant sense, useful, we illicitly intuit that they are not
known. is is the psychological claim against which we test my (a)–(c)
above.
Were this psychological claim true, Hawthorne’s story might be a plau-
sible one. It predicts the intuitiveness of Ignorance, and does so in a way that
builds in insensitivity. So (b) and (c) are met.7 What of (a)? Is Hawthorne’s
psychological claim true? Surprisingly, Hawthorne says little in particular
defense of it. And it is not hard to see that it does not, in generality, stand.
For some junk disjunctive knowledge, though obviously junk, is neverthe-
less obviously known. For instance, I know that Barack Obama was born
in Hawaii; on this basis, I know that Obama was born in Hawaii or Rhode
Island. Admittedly, claiming this knowledge generates a false implicature—
namely that, were I to come to believe Obama was not born in Hawaii, I
would believe him to have been born in Rhode Island—nevertheless, the
knowledge claim does sound true, in a way that the target one did not. But
each is equally junk. Hawthorne’s attempt to explain away, then, seems to
fail the (a) condition; the psychological premise on which the story relies is
not true. A successful explaining-away must rst be a successful explaining.
PerhapsHawthorne, or someone sympathetic to his approach, will argue
in response that I have not correctly formulated the psychological principle
on which he is relying. It is not the mere fact of junk disjunctive knowledge
that generates skeptical intuitions, but some further feature of the Times and
Guardian case: junk knowledge that meets some additional criterion. Upon
identifying this criterion, then, one can reformulate the psychological ele-
ment of Hawthorne’s explaining-away, avoiding my counterexample-based
objection. In principle, this is a legitimate move.at it is an open question
7 One could try to deny (c), admitting Hawthorne’s link between uselessness and intuitions
of non-knowledge, but insisting that those intuitions are veridical.is would be in eect
to make usefulness of the relevant sort a necessary condition for knowledge of a disjunc-
tion.is move strikes me as too extreme to be at all plausible, but perhaps someone could
make a case for it. It is the structural parallel to the suggestion that safety and sensitivity
are aer all equivalent in the Sosa case.
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whether a better psychological principle is available shows that it is an open
question whether there is a possible explaining-away of the recalcitrant in-
tuition in this case. Of course, the onus is on Hawthorne to articulate such.
But here is a worry for attempts to rene explainings-away along these
lines. e more one renes one’s psychological principle to avoid obvious
counterexample, the more danger one runs of oering an explaining away
that is drained of its rhetorical force. In his original case, Hawthorne cited
the claim that junk disjunctive knowledge is generally intuited to be un-
known. An important feature of the explaining away—the part that ensured
the (c) condition—was that this human tendency, if actual, is a mistake. All
parties agree that there is some junk disjunctive knowledge; if our intuitions
consistently judge junk disjunctions as unknown, this does give us reason to
discredit these kinds of intuitions. But if, in response to the observation that
the general psychological claim is false, Hawthornewere to limit the psycho-
logical claim to one aecting only some limited subset of junk disjunctive
knowledge, it is less obvious that a mistake is being made. e contextual-
ist, for example, may well agree with a strengthened version of Hawthorne’s
psychological theory—he may say, for instance, that we’re inclined to intuit
knowledge attributions to be false when the content of the alleged piece of
knowledge is a disjunction that includes a disjunct that raises certain skepti-
cal possibilities to salience. But whether this tendency represents a mistake
is exactly what is at issue betweenHawthorne and the contextualist. On pain
of begging the question, then, Hawthorne cannot cite a principle like this is
his explaining-away of skeptical intuitions.
To defend Hawthorne’s explaining away of this intuition in an eective
way, one would have to posit a psychological claim that, unlike Hawthorne’s
original attempt, is plausibly true, and also, unlike the attempt just consid-
ered, uncontroversially represents an error. Perhaps this could be done, al-
though I confess I cannot see how.
2.2 Stanley
A similar problem besets an attempt to explain away by Jason Stanley in
Knowledge and Practical Interests. Stanley’s approach to knowledge has a
counterintuitive consequence with respect to this case:
High Attributor-Low Subject Stakes. Hannah and her wife Sarah are
driving home on a Friday aernoon.ey plan to stop at the bank on
the way home to deposit their paychecks. Since they have an impend-
ing bill coming due, and very little in their account, it is very impor-
tant that they deposit their paychecks by Saturday. Hannah calls up
Bill on her cell phone, and asks Bill whether the bank will be open on
Saturday. Bill replies by telling Hannah, ‘Well, I was there two weeks
ago on a Saturday, and it was open.’ Aer reporting the discussion
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to Sarah, Hannah concludes that, since banks do occasionally change
their hours, ‘Bill does not really know that the bank will be open on
Saturday’. (Stanley 2005, 5)
Intuitively, Hannah’s last utterance is both sensible and true. Stanley,
however, gives an approach to knowledge on which it is false. According to
Stanley, whether S knows that p depends on whether p is important to S,
but not on whether p is important to the attributor of knowledge or non-
knowledge. So on Stanley’s view, Hannah is wrong when she says that Bill
does not know: Bill does know, because the stakes are not high for Bill.at
the stakes are high for Hannah is irrelevant with respect to Bill’s knowledge.
And indeed, since Hannah knows that Bill is disinterested, she has no rea-
son to think that he does not know. So Stanley’s view faces this recalcitrant
intuition:
Correct In the case considered, Hannah is correct to deny knowledge
of Bill.
His task, therefore, is to explain Correct away. Stanley writes:
Here is an intuitively plausible account of what is occurring in High
Attributor-Low Subject Stakes. . . . When High Stakes wants to know
whether another person knows that p, it is presumably because High
Stakes has an important decision tomake, one that hinges uponwhet-
her or not p. . . .What High Stakes is interested in nding out, then, is
whether someone else’s information state is sucient for High Stakes
to know that p. In short, the purposeHigh Stakes has in asking some-
one else whether or not p is true lies in nding out whether, if that
person had the interests and concerns High Stakes does, that person
would know that p. . . .
We are now in a possession of a perfectly intuitive explanation of
the intuitions in High Attributor-Low Subject Stakes. Hannah and
Sarah are worried about their impending bill, and so they want to
know whether the bank will be open on Saturday. It is to resolve this
question that they phone Bill. What they want to know from Bill is
whether he has evidence such that, were he in their practical situa-
tion, it would suce as knowledge. . . .Of course, were Bill to share
Hannah and Sarah’s practical situation, he would be in a High Stakes
situation, and so would not know, on the basis of the evidence that he
actually has, that the bank will be open on Saturday. So Hannah and
Sarah are perfectly correct to conclude that the answer to their actual
concern—whether Bill would know that the bank will be open if he
were in Hannah and Sarah’s practical situation—is negative.
. . . So, we are strongly inclined to go along with Hannah and Sarah’s
judgments, since we recognize that they are perfectly correct about
the information in which they are really interested. (Stanley 2005,
101–103)
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Stanley’s strategy against Correct seems to comprise these claims:
(1) When Hannah asks Bill whether he knows that the bank is open,
what she really wants to nd out is whether his evidence would be
sucient for her to know whether the bank is open.
(2) Bill’s evidence would not be sucient for Hannah to know whether
the bank is open.
(3) In general, when someone asks whether X because she really wants
to nd out whether Y, and the answer tells her that not-Y, she will
have the intuition that not-X.
(4) In general, when someone has the intuition that not-X because she
asked whether X, intending to nd out whether Y, and learned that
not-Y, we will have the intuition that her intuition that not-X is cor-
rect, even when X is true.
ese four claims seem to be sucient, if true, for a successful explain-
ing of Correct away. e four claims together do seem to explain Hannah’s
reaction to Bill, and our intuition that it is correct, and to do so in a way
that diminishes the probative force of that intuition. Let us grant (1) and (2),
at least for the purpose of argument. Stanley’s (3) and (4) are psychological
claims; if they are true, then, combined with (1) and (2), they would explain
Correct away. As before, the (b) and (c) conditions are met. But what of (a)?
Are Stanley’s psychological claims true?
It is surprising, I think, that Stanley does not go to more eort to defend
(3) and (4).ere is, in the text, a sort of “just so” story about the purpose of
communication, meant to show how truths like (3) could arise. But there is
nothing like an extended defense of the actual truth of either (3) or (4). And
indeed, neither appears to be particularly plausible.
Suppose I am getting dressed and hoping to impress my friend Kather-
ine who is a fashion maven. I ask you this question: ‘Do I look hip and
awesome?’ (In fact, let us stipulate, I do look hip and awesome.) I ask this
question because I want to know whether Katherine will be impressed. You
divine my true purpose and do not even bother looking at me. ‘Katherine
is in a bad mood, and wo not be impressed no matter what you wear.’ Stan-
ley’s (3) has it that I should now have the intuition that I do not look hip and
awesome; Stanley’s (4) has it that third-party observers should intuit that I
speak truly if I say, ‘I do not look hip and awesome’. But neither of these
predictions are met. I remain agnostic about the question, and it is clear to
third-party observers that I do look hip and awesome. So I think that Stan-
ley’s explaining-away, like Hawthorne’s, relies on too careless an empirical
psychological claim.
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Of course, as in the previous case, there is room for some considerable
back-and-forth here. Perhaps (3) and (4) could be modied to avoid my ob-
jection; perhaps there is an alternative possible successful explaining-away
of Correct.e challenges for Stanley will be similar to the ones I discussed
for Hawthorne above.
Perhaps it will be objected that I am demanding toomuch of Hawthorne
and Stanley’s attempts to explain away; that, read in their broader context—
which includes independent arguments for their respective views, and inde-
pendent criticism of their contextualist rivals, who do capture the intuitive
judgments—they have no great obligation to tell a thorough psychological
story about the source of the mistaken intuitions. As will emerge below,
there is much about this suggestion with which I agree. I think that the em-
phasis that some philosophers have placed on explaining away intuitions is
excessive, and that sometimes, it is legitimate for philosophers simply and
barely to accept counterintuitive consequences, without providing explana-
tions about from where the faulty intuitions derive. But it must be admitted
that to give up on explaining the origins of an intuition is to give up on ex-
plaining the intuition away.ere is a dierence between explaining away an
intuition and biting a bullet. Insofar as Hawthorne and Stanley are attempt-
ing to explain away intuitions—which is what they both say they’re doing—I
have argued that they fail. I have said nothing against the alternate strategy
of simply biting the relevant bullets; to evaluate that strategy is to evaluate
the merits and drawbacks of the views on the whole, along with those of
their competitors.
e shared moral of the Hawthorne and Stanley cases, I think, is that
philosophers who wish to explain away intuitions must take care to explain
them with plausible psychological principles. ere is room for a consider-
able variation on how one goes about establishing such psychological plau-
sibility; in many cases, consideration of a number of examples is sucient. I
think that was so in the Sosa case discussed above. My nal case study, from
Tamara Horowitz, represents a muchmore empirically grounded attempt to
explain away intuitions.
2.3 Horowitz
Tamara Horowitz (1998) provides a good example of a more thorough, care-
ful, and empirically-informed attempt to explain away intuitions than do the
examples given by Hawthorne and Stanley above. Horowitz is considering a
particular sort of moral intuition that is sometimes used to support the ex-
istence of a morally relevant distinction between killing and letting die—or,
Jonathan Ichikawa 105
more generally, between doing and allowing.8 (Horowitz’s particular target
in her paper is Warren Quinn, but his view, I think, represents a widespread
approach.)
Consider a consequentialist who thinks that themoral value of an action
is determined entirely by its results. In particular, that someone dies as a
result of an action counts equally against that action, regardless of whether
the person is killed, or whether the person is merely permitted to die. Here
is a familiar anti-consequentialist argument:
Given the choice between saving one drowning person in one place, or
saving ve drowning people in another place, it would intuitively be a good
thing to do to save the ve people, letting the one person die. But, given the
choice between letting ve drowning people die versus killing one person
(perhaps by driving over him, where he is trapped on the road) in order to
save the ve people, it would be intuitively bad to save the ve people by
killing the one person. Since both cases are alike with respect to how many
people live and die, there are more morally signicant factors at work—in
particular, the fact that in the second case, you would be killing someone
makes that decision worse than in the rst case, where you would be merely
letting someone die.
As in the cases above, we have a theory and a recalcitrant intuition. What
is the consequentialist to do? He is committed to the falsehood of this intu-
itive claim:
Better In the case considered, it is better to let ve people die than to kill
one person.
How can he gild the pill? Horowitz provides an insightful suggestion.
ere is a general psychological tendency, she says, citing the inuential
8 One caveat: Horowitz may be thinking of her own project in a way that does not t exactly
into the mold I have cast for explaining away intuitions. In particular, she focuses more
on a philosophical project that seeks to explicate the norms that are encoded in human
beings, than on facts about extra-mental ethical reality. “Some philosophers,” she writes,
not apparently intending to distance herself from them, “particularly ethicists and epis-
temologists, see as one of their tasks the discovery of norms, ethical or epistemological,
that we more or less live by” (Horowitz 1998, 367). She declines ultimately to take a stand
on the questions of objective morality, oering (Horowitz 1998, 381) ocial agnosticism
about a morally signicant dierence between the relevant cases, but expressing—rightly,
in my view—some skepticism about the alleged distinction, in light of her psychological
proposal. However, it seems clear that an ethicist intending to engage in question of moral
reality could put Horowitz’s proposal to use in an attempt to respond to intuitions about
killing and letting die. In what follows, I will speak loosely and attribute that project to
Horowitz, with the understanding that her own ocial view may be somewhat weaker,
limiting itself to psychological claims.
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work of Kahneman and Tversky, to evaluate gains and losses asymmetri-
cally. And what is counted as a “gain” or a “loss” depends on the relatively
arbitrary setting of a “neutral” point. It is the same phenomenon that un-
derwrites other sorts of prima facie surprising decision asymmetries. Here
is an example (described by Horowitz 1998, 369–370):
Case 1: First, I give you $300.en, I oer you a choice: you can either
(a) take another $100 and walk away, or (b) ip a coin: if it’s heads, I’ll
give you $200 more; if it’s tails, you get nothing more.
In case 1, most people take the sure $100, rather than gambling.
Case 2: First, I give you $500. en, I oer you a choice: you can
either (a) give me back $100 and walk away, or (b) ip a coin: if it’s
tails, you have to give me back $200; if it’s heads, you lose nothing.
In case 2, most people gamble for the chance to keep the full $500. But
of course, the two cases are exactly equivalent: both are a choice between
gaining a sure $400, or a 50/50 chance of gaining either $300 or $500. at
subjects tend to respond asymmetrically shows that they are responding
to features other than those that actually dene their options. Kahneman
and Tversky’s suggestion is that people respond asymmetrically to gains and
losses, dened relative to whatever “neutral” point is salient to them. In the
case above, the neutral point is set by the amount of cash that starts in their
hands. Gains are treated with less signicance than are losses.
Horowitz’s interesting suggestion is that the same psychological phe-
nomenon underwrites Better. When all six people are already in mortal
peril, the neutral point is set at six deaths; to save ve of them is to gain
ve, which is straightforwardly better than gaining one. But if one’s neu-
tral point has Roady living, and the ve swimmers dying, then one weighs
Roady as a loss, which is counted more signicantly than are the swimmers,
who would represent mere potential gains.
Insofar, then, as the asymmetry in intuitions relies on a quite general
asymmetry between perceived gains and perceived losses, we have the re-
sources to explain the appeal of Better away: We have the intuition that sav-
ing the ve in case 1 is better than saving the ve in case 2 because we weight
the loss of the individual in case 1 as less important than the loss of the in-
dividual in case 2. In general, we consider potential gains as less important
than potential losses, even when their true values are equal.
Here, as before, a psychological generalization predicts the oending
judgment, and does so in a way that does not depend on its truth. So (b) and
(c) are met. In this instance, unlike the previous case studies, I am inclined
to accept (a) as well-established, too. I think this explaining-away succeeds.
is is not to claim, of course, that there is not room to challenge it; one
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might do so by presenting counterexamples to the generalized psycholog-
ical claim, or by denying that Better is an example of the relevant general
kind. Or, of course, one may accept this explaining-away while continuing
to think that there are serious problems—even intuition-based problems—
for consequentialism, perhaps comprising alternative intuitions that escape
this explaining away. Whether an intuition against a view is explained away
is nothing close to the be-all-and-end-all of the view’s merits.
3. Must we Explain Away?
e case studies suggest that to explain away an intuition, one oers a psy-
chological thesis to explain why people would have the oending intuition,
even if it were not true. One’s explaining away is successful insofar as the
psychological thesis (a) is true, (b) predicts the oending intuition, and (c)
does not depend upon the truth of the oending intuition. If this sounds
tautological, perhaps it is, but it is worth a clear reminder. As the case stud-
ies indicate, too oen, attempts to explain intuitions away fail in obvious
ways.
As suggested in my discussion of Hawthorne and Stanley, however, to
fail to explain away an intuition need not always be to lose the game. What
if an explaining-away does fail? How bad is it to have a view with coun-
terintuitive consequences, while unable to explain the oending intuitions
away?
We can start by asking why we bother explaining intuitions away at all.
Widespread practice notwithstanding, it is not prima facieobviouswhyphilo-
sophers should, in general, be concerned with explaining intuitions, or with
explaining them away. Intuitions are psychological entities; philosophical
theories are not, in general, psychological theories. Ontologists theorize
about what there is; it is quite another matter, one might think, what peo-
ple think there is. Epistemologists concern themselves with knowledge, not
with folk intuitions about knowledge.9
Some philosophers, even some who recognize that philosophical ques-
9 is characterization of philosophical subject matter is, as the previous footnote demon-
strates, not entirely uncontroversial. Much of the twentieth century was dominated by the
“linguistic turn”, which had it that philosophical questions were ultimately questions about
the meanings of natural language terms. A descendant of this tradition has it that philo-
sophical subject matter is conceptual-explication of our concepts is all that philosophy can
hope to do. ese restrictionist views about the proper subject matter of philosophy are
now widely, if not quite universally, thought to be mistaken. A philosopher may study the
meaning of the word ‘knowledge’, or facts about the structure or cognitive signicance of
the concept knowledge, but he may also choose to study knowledge itself; if he does so, he
may or may not nd study of these psychological elements to be useful intermediary steps.
See (Williamson 2007, chs. 1–2).
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tions are oen questions about extra-mental reality, think of intuitions as
playing a special foundationalist role in the epistemology of philosophy. Such
philosophers include both defenders of intuition-based philosophy and crit-
ics.10 Can such an approach explain the importance placed on explaining
away intuitions? In other work, I have criticized the shared assumption
that intuition does play this central evidential role in standard philosoph-
ical practice; however, even granting for the sake of argument such a special
role to intuitions, it is not clear to me what onus there is on a philosophi-
cal theorist to explain away misleading intuitions. Aer all, we (almost) all
agree that some intuitions are mistaken.11 A philosopher with good reason
to accept some theory, where that theory is inconsistent with some intuition,
thereby has some good reason to describe that intuition as mistaken. If he
does not know why we have the intuition—he cannot explain it, much less
explain it away—why should this psychological ignorance be an obstacle to
his philosophical theory?
By way of comparison, consider the attribution of false beliefs.12 Beliefs,
like intuitions, are sometimes mistaken, but, as in the case of intuition, most
of our beliefs are true. Sometimes, theorists—be they physicists, phoneti-
cists, philologists, or philosophers—argue for theories that are inconsistent
with some of our beliefs. ey do not, in general, face any requirement, or
even any prima facie requirement, to explain why we have those false beliefs;
they simply show us a reason to reject them, and ask us to do so. ere is
no obvious reason why the burden to explain away false intuitions should be
any dierent.
Yet it is clear that at least some philosophers consider there to be such a
burden. To take one example, Conee and Feldman (2004) argue against ex-
ternalist approaches to epistemic justication by claiming that, unlike their
preferred internalist approach, these approaches have no resources to ex-
plain away skeptical intuitions. Any view that cannot “make sense of ” skep-
ticism is thereby objectionable. In what, if anything, does such a burden
consist?
10 Prominent advocates of philosophy based in intuition include Bealer and Strawson (1992)
and Sosa (2007a,b). See (Stich 1990, forthcoming), (Hintikka 1999), and (Weinberg et al.
2001) for a few statements of the critical point of view.
11 Ludwig (2007) defends an account according to which intuition is factive. On such an ac-
count, of course, inconsistency with an intuition entails that a theory is false. Nevertheless,
one can still, on such an account, do something importantly like reject the truth of an in-
tuition: one can reject the truth (and intuitionhood) of an apparent intuition. So likewise
could one, if one cared to, attempt to explain away the apparent intuition.
12 According to the account I favor, false beliefs are false intuitions. See (Ichikawa
manuscript). See also (Williamson 2004). One need not accept this identity to accept
the analogy here oered.
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Certainly, a theorist gains some advantages by explaining away oending
intuitions.
One reason it is a virtue of a theory that it come alongwith an explaining-
away of recalcitrant intuitions is that in general, it is a theoretical virtue of
a theory that it explain truths. If it is a fact that many people have the intu-
ition that p, then a theory that predicts and explains this fact thereby gains
some limited appeal. With respect to this consideration, there is nothing at
all special about recalcitrant intuitions: it is also a theoretical virtue of a the-
ory if it explains why many people have such-and-such correct intuitions, or
if it explains why objects tend to fall downward, or if it predicts the recent
economic downturn. Plainly, if this is the only reason it is valuable to ex-
plain away intuitions, it is a relatively edentulous one, and the widespread
emphasis on explaining-away is misplaced. If I’m to theorize about, say, the
nature of reference, I should not feel at all guilty if I fail to explain why peo-
ple like chocolate, or why the Detroit Lions are so bad. Why should I feel
dierently about the fact that some people think that in Kripke’s story, the
name ‘Gödel’ refers to Schmidt? is psychological fact is interesting, and
is, it seems to me, well worth explaining. But it is not clear why it should be
the reference theorist’s job to explain it. His job is to explain reference, not
to explain intuitions about reference.13
4. Must Philosophers Explain Away Survey Data?
I disagree, therefore, with a certain alleged skeptical upshot of some survey-
based experimental philosophy. I have in mind in particular data which
purports to show that intuitions about central philosophical cases—Gettier
cases are the favorite example—vary systematically according to cultural
backgrounds. For example, Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich famously pro-
duced data suggesting that East Asians are less likely than Westerners are
to have the standard skeptical intuition about Gettier cases. Although he
means to resist metaphilosophical skepticism, some of Ernest Sosa’s writ-
13 e philosopher who considers explaining away intuitions to be mandatory is a bit like
the farmer in E. B. White’s novel, Charlotte’s Web. (See (Dreier forthcoming). My use of
the example is inspired by Dreier’s in the obvious ways.) Charlotte, a remarkable spider,
sets out to save Wilbur, a rather ordinary pig, from the slaughterhouse. She does this by
weaving intricate messages over Wilber’s sty, spelling out such phrases as some pig and
humble.e farmer is very impressed byWilbur—what an amazing pig, to be such that a
spider will write suchmessages above it!—but pooh-poohs his wife’s suggestion to wonder
whether they have an extraordinary spider. He errs in looking to the pig for the explanation
of the odd responses the pig evoked, when they should have looked to the spider, who
was the one responding. So it is, I think, when a philosopher considers it of paramount
importance to explain, in terms of one’s target phenomenon (e.g. knowledge), people’s
responses to it (e.g. intuitions about knowledge).
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ings suggest that, if the disagreement is real, there is an important onus to
explain away the oending intuition among the East Asians:
Obviously, half of them are getting it right, and half wrong. Of those
who get it right, now, how plausible can it be that their beliefs con-
stitute or derive from rational intuition, from an attraction to assent
that manifests a real competence?
Not that it is logically incoherent to maintain exactly that. But how
plausible can it be, absent some theory of error that will explain why
so many are going wrong when we are getting it right? Unless we can
cite something dierent in the conditions or in the constitution of the
misled, doubt will surely cloud the claim to competence by those who
ex hypothesi are getting it right. (Sosa 2007a, 102)
Sosa here suggests that, assuming the disagreement is actual, one’s ra-
tional condence in the standard Gettier judgment hangs on the providing
of an explaining-away. (Sosa also provides reasons to dispute whether the
apparent disagreement is actual.) Stephen Stich enthusiastically agrees with
this suggestion:
It is worth emphasizing the enormous importance of this point, on
which Sosa and I apparently agree. For 2500 years, philosophers have
been relying on appeals to intuition. But the plausibility of this entire
tradition rests on an unsubstantiated, and until recently unacknowl-
edged, empirical hypothesis—the hypothesis that the philosophical in-
tuitions of people in dierent cultural groups do not disagree. ose
philosophers who rely on intuition are betting that the hypothesis is
true. If they lose their bet, and if I am right that the prospects are
very dim indeed for producing a convincing theory of error, which
explains why a substantial part of the world’s population has false in-
tuitions about knowledge, justice, happiness and the like, then a great
deal of what goes on in contemporary philosophy, and a great deal
of what has gone on in the past, belongs in the rubbish bin. (Stich
forthcoming, emphasis in original).14
It is helpful to consider some analogies. I know that the Earth is more
than one million years old; I also know that not everyone knows that; some
people think that the earth is only several thousand years old. Suppose some-
one did a survey and discovered that the distribution of people who believed
the earth wasmore than onemillion years old correlated with certain demo-
graphic variables. Christians might be especially likely to disagree with me
about the age of the Earth. Perhaps residents of Louisiana. For symmetry’s
14 An exegetical note: I suspect that Stichmay be exaggerating the extent towhich Sosa agrees
that failure to provide an explaining-away would be catastrophic; one may be troubled by
doubt without chucking philosophical mainstays into the rubbish bin.
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sake, let us suppose that our survey results indicated, somewhat surprisingly,
that East Asians aremore likely to think the Earth less than onemillion years
old than are Westerners. Here, now, from my armchair, I do not know what
explanation I could attempt to oer for such surprising data, should I be of-
fered it. I would be at a loss to provide a substantive and plausible theory
of error to explain the wrongness of so many East Asian judgments. (Rel-
atively trivial and unilluminating theories might be available: “East Asians,
unlikeWesterners, tend to be disposed to judge that the Earth is less than one
million years old; since the Earth is more than one million years old, East
Asians are likely to have unreliable intuitions about the age of the Earth.”
is theory, even if true and known, presumably does not satisfy the call for
a “theory of error”.)
In this case at least, I think that the obvious thing to say is that we’ve
discovered that members of a certain demographic group are not reliable
judges about the age of the Earth; the proper response in this case is surely
not skepticism.
(Consider also the Sonic and Mario case discussed above. In this in-
stance, the view that Sonic did not collect gold coins is well-supported, for
those of us who remember the game well enough, or for those of us who
have looked it up recently—even if many people falsely believe that Sonic
collected gold coins. Possession of the particular error theory is an addi-
tional epistemic good; but lacking it does not in any way impugn the theory
that Sonic did not collect gold coins. If I know that many people believe
that he did, then I may just know that many people are wrong about Sonic,
without being able to articulate from what source their error derives.)
No doubt, it will be thought by many that this case is importantly dier-
ent from the philosophical case. My knowledge about the age of the Earth
comes from a rich education and contact with expert scientists whom I have
independent reason to trust on these matters. True enough—but is the case
in philosophy so dierent? My philosophical education is rich too—in my
own case, much richer than my scientic one!—and I’m in contact with ex-
perts about knowledge. Indeed, my Ph.D. thesis was in epistemology, and
I hope that I can, without hubris, claim a certain degree of expertise in this
matter myself, at least relative to the folk.
So what relevant dierence between the geological case and the philo-
sophical case could obtain? Here is an obvious dierence: my Gettier judg-
ment is plausibly a priori; my judgment about the age of the Earth is not. If
someone believes that the Earth is less than one million years old, it is be-
cause he lacks important evidence; the person who thinks Jones knows has
all the relevant evidence. So goes one argument.
112 Explaining Away Intuitions
is disanalogy cannot stand up as presented. As philosophers well
know, not all a priori investigations are easy; there is no guarantee that just
anyone will get these questions right. (Compare the analogous situation
when the folk disagree with a mathematician about an a priori mathemat-
ical fact.) To recognize Gettier cases as cases of non-knowledge is a cog-
nitive achievement; it is entirely possible that, without philosophical train-
ing, some people might fail to achieve it. Just as people who have studied
chemistry and physics are more likely to make correct judgments about the
constitution of tables and chairs, so too are people who have studied epis-
temology more likely to make correct judgments about knowledge. is is
just as it should be.15
Another example in the domain of the a priori can, I think, make this
even clearer. People regularly and systematically err in probabilistic reason-
ing. In a famous set of experiments by Kahneman and Tversky, subjects
were quite prone to judge some conjunctions (Linda is a bank teller and a
feminist) as more likely than one of their conjuncts (Linda is a bank teller).
Suppose for the sake of symmetry that this tendency was found to be much
more widespread in East Asians than in Westerners. Would the axioms of
probability theory have to be thrown into the rubbish bin, unless someone
could come up with a suitable theory of error? Surely not: we have every
reason to be more condent that the axioms are true than that most East
Asians should be good at reasoning probabilistically.16,17
Sometimes, the appropriate response to disagreement—including wide-
spread disagreementwithin a particular demographic group—is to conclude
on the basis of the disagreement that one’s interlocutors are unreliable.is
even in cases where no obvious (and non-trivial) suggestion for a theory of
15 Cf. Williamson’s (2007) suggestion that describing a judgment as a priori does little by
itself to explain how it is known. anks to an anonymous referee for pointing out the
relevance of this point.
16 An interesting distraction in this case is that a plausible theory of error is available: the
heuristics humans use to estimate probability track imaginability; sometimes, conjunc-
tions are easier to imagine than one of their conjuncts (these are the times when the second
conjunct gives you a clue as to how to imagine the rst)—when subjects nd something
more easily imaginable, they judge it more likely. is theory also explains why English
speakers are likely to think there are more words that begin with ‘k’ than there are words
with ‘k’ as the third letter, and why so many people think they’re more likely to die on an
airplane than in a car. See (Kahneman and Tversky 1973). But of course, this explanation
would be only partial; it would explainwhy people err as they do, but notwhy, as stipulated,
there is cultural regularity with respect to the prominence of the mistake.
17 Incredibly, Stich (1990) dissents from this truism, suggesting instead that we consider it
an open question whether the probability axioms or the surprising intuition about Linda
is correct. is, I think, goes much too far; it is a gadarene open-mindedness, and the
terminus of its short course is an austere skepticism.
Jonathan Ichikawa 113
error is forthcoming.is should be obvious about the age of the Earth case;
my suggestion is that there is no great reason to treatGettier cases dierently.
One need not, then, if one fails to explain an intuition away, throw ev-
erything into the rubbish bin. Humans are funny creatures, and sometimes
do and think funny things.at someone, or some demographic group, dis-
agrees with an implication ofmy theory does not automaticallymandate that
I explain away their disagreement, on pain of irresponsible dogmatism.
5. Value for Explaining Away
But I do notmean to suggest that there is no value for philosophers in engag-
ing in these explainings-away. I suggested above that there is at least some
value in capturing data in general, including the case where the datum is a
fact about someone’s intuitions. But there are reasons to explain away intu-
itions beyond that rather anemic one.
e cases I have been focusing on so far are cases where a subject has
conclusive reason to accept some conclusion, and is then faced with some-
one else who nds that conclusion counterintuitive. As I have emphasized,
this is sometimes the case—perhaps more oen than some experimentalists
with skeptical proclivities think. But there are other important cases to con-
sider, including some in which explaining away intuitions can play a more
prominent role. Sometimes, for instance, a philosopher may be deliberat-
ing about a particular view, without being at all sure what to think. I nd
in myself conicting intuitions, and do not know which to endorse. If I can
see that one of those intuitions is a member of a class that I’m likely to nd
appealing even if false, this might provide me with some reason to prefer
the other. e Horowitz case provides a nice example: if I am in internal
tension between (a) the thought that it is better to do that which results in
more lives being saved, and (b) the thought that it is wrong to kill somebody
in a way over and above the way it is wrong to let somebody die, I may, if I’m
convinced by her explaining-away, discount (b) as the product of a general
error in rationality.
e phenomenon is, as I’ve been emphasizing, not limited to philoso-
phy. When confronted with Müller-Lyer lines, I am inclined to judge one
longer than the other, but I know enough about the psychology of percep-
tion to discount that inclination. Similar reasoning is at play in the manage-
ment of documented biases. If I am hiring, and a candidate appears well-
qualied, but I also have a bad feeling about him, I may, even if I generally
place probative value on such intuitive feelings about applicants, discount it
if the candidate is black, and I know (either on general inductive grounds,
or specically) that I’m likely to be biased against black candidates, discount
that feeling. Explaining away intuitions, then, can be a very helpful thing to
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do when deliberating.
Similiarly and relatedly, explaining away intuitions can play a powerful
dialectical role. If you and I are arguing, you can gain considerable traction
with me if you can convince me that my position is the sort of position that
I would be likely to have, even if it were not true. Suppose I’m in love with
a woman, and you do not think she is trustworthy. I’m arguing with you: I
know her best; you do not know what she’s been through; I’m a good judge
of character and can look into her eyes and tell that she is trustworthy. Per-
haps the rst-order evidence you can point to against her character is totally
uncompelling for me. You may, however, make inroads if you stop telling
me things about her, and start telling me things about me: you can remind
me that I tend to fall in love without regard to a woman’s trustworthiness,
and also that, when I love someone, I tend to think she is trustworthy even
when she is not. Of course, youmight still fail to convinceme—I can be very
stubborn in love—but you do at least have a chance, if you can establish these
psychological facts aboutme. You explain away the evidence I thought I had.
So explaining away can also have a signicant dialectical force.
To conclude: two themes have emerged in this discussion of explaining
away intuitions. e rst, illustrated by consideration of the case studies, is
that explaining away intuitions is more dicult than is oen thought; one
relies, in an attempt to explain an intuition away, on particular psycholog-
ical generalizations, and these generalizations are answerable to, and sup-
portable only by, the psychological facts. is is not necessarily to say that
one must be engaging in rigorous psychological methodology in order re-
sponsibly to attempt to explain away—sometimes, informal consideration of
intuitive responses to cases is plausibly sucient. But philosophers propos-
ing psychological theories to explain away intuitions ought to reect, at least
minimally, on whether the generalizations upon which they rely are plausi-
ble; too oen, as in the cases proposed by Hawthorne and Stanley, they are
not.
e second theme ameliorates, to some extent, the rst. Although it is
more dicult than has sometimes been recognized to explain away intu-
itions, it is also less important. ere are counterintuitive truths; nding
one need not be cause for embarrassment. In cases where counterintuitive
consequences of otherwise appealing theories are discovered, my advice to
philosophers is to be upfront. Gild the pill with an explaining-away if you
have a plausible one to oer; if you do not, then admit that you have a coun-
terintuitive consequence to swallow, and explain why it is worth it to do so.
Weak attempts to explain away recalcitrant intuitions only further muddy
the issue.
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